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DISPUTE SYSTEM DESIGN AND BIAS IN
DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Lisa Blomgren Amsler, Alexander B. Avtgis, and M. Scott Jackman*
ABSTRACT
This article examines the role of mediator race and gender in perceptions
of procedural justice as measure of accountability and representative bu-
reaucracy in a national mediation program for complaints of employment
discrimination at a large federal organization, the United States Postal Ser-
vice. Mediation represents a forum of accountability in which employees
may hold an employer accountable for violating federal law prohibiting
forms of employment discrimination, in this case, race discrimination, sex
discrimination, and sexual harassment. Representative bureaucracy theory
suggests passive or symbolic representation when the demographics of
public officials should mirror those of the public they serve. Some research
suggests active representation when race or gender of a public official
match those of a member of the public. During the period 1997-99, media-
tion exit surveys collected information about the nature of an employee’s
claim. Using the nature of the claim as a proxy variable for a claimant’s
race or gender, researchers examine complainants’ perceptions of media-
tion when the nature of the claim matches the demographics (race or gen-
der) of the mediator. In this exploratory research, analyses show no
statistically significant difference in satisfaction with the fairness of media-
tion process or mediator based on race of the mediator in race discrimina-
tion claims. However, there is statistically significantly lower satisfaction
with mediation outcome based on mediator race as African American
when it matches the nature of the claim of race discrimination. In all analy-
ses of sex discrimination and sexual harassment claims, there are no statis-
tically significant differences in satisfaction with the mediation process,
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mediator, or outcome when the mediator is female, although findings are
borderline as to sexual harassment claims. These findings suggest the need
for further research on accountability and bureaucratic representation in
the diversity of mediator rosters. In addition, researchers need to control
for the dispute system design and context within which mediation occurs.
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INTRODUCTION
INSPIRED by the landmark work of Professor Richard Delgado,1 thissymposium addresses evidence of informal dispute resolution’s im-pact, for good or ill, on people of color, women, and people with less
power in society. Do informal legal processes such as mediation disadvan-
tage these communities?2 Individual cases of mediator or arbitrator bias
are notoriously difficult to detect, measure, and prove. Systemic patterns
of bias may appear in quantitative studies of outcomes but present chal-
lenges as to causation. How do we address the issue of bias in dispute
resolution?
1. See generally Richard Delgado, Chris Dunn, Pamela Brown, Helena Lee & David
Hubbert, Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359 (1985).
2. See generally Richard Delgado, Conflict as Pathology: An Essay for Trina Grillo,
81 MINN. L. REV. 1391 (1997); Richard Delgado, When a Story Is Just a Story: Does Voice
Really Matter?, 76 VA. L. REV. 95 (1990).
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Focusing on mediation in employment, this article approaches bias in
dispute resolution through three academic literatures: dispute system de-
sign (DSD), accountability, and representative bureaucracy. First, we ar-
gue that scholars need to approach questions of bias in the context of the
system in which people experience dispute resolution. When an employer
constructs or selects a roster of mediators or arbitrators, this is a system
design choice as to process or structure, an element of the Analytic
Framework of DSD.3 Another question in the Analytic Framework is
how to make the system accountable to participants.4 Procedural justice
provides a frame through which to consider accountability as to the medi-
ator’s performance. The system’s design and roster composition present
questions of bureaucratic representativeness. Do the mediators on the
roster reflect the composition of the workforce that uses the system? By
examining accountability and representativeness in the context of a sys-
tem’s design, we approach bias in conflict resolution with more empirical
rigor.
Using accountability theory and representativeness, this article ana-
lyzes a sample of data from the United States Postal Service (USPS) RE-
DRESS Program, a mediation program for employment disputes, to
address these questions. First, we review DSD and the design of RE-
DRESS. Second, we review public affairs literature on accountability, ar-
guing that procedural and distributive justice provide appropriate
empirical measures. Third, we examine public affairs literature on repre-
sentative bureaucracy and the impact of representativeness on program
outcomes. Finally, we attempt to examine empirically the following ques-
tions: When an employee agrees to mediate their complaint of race or sex
discrimination in employment, what impact does the race or gender of
the mediator have on their perceptions? If the mediator’s race or gender
matches the nature of the complaint in a case of race (African-American
or black) or sex (female) discrimination, and thus by inference matches
that of the complainant, does this affect the complainant’s perceptions of
procedural justice? Using complainant perceptions of mediation fairness,
mediator fairness, and satisfaction with outcomes in the USPS RE-
DRESS program, we examined whether it affects a mediation partici-
pant’s judgments when the mediator’s race or gender match the nature of
the claim or purview of an employee’s complaint in race discrimination,
sex discrimination, or sexual harassment cases.
I. DISPUTE SYSTEM DESIGN AND THE USPS
REDRESS PROGRAM
DSD is the applied art and science of designing the means to prevent,
3. Stephanie Smith & Janet Martinez, An Analytic Framework for Dispute System
Design, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 123, 129–33 (2009) (publishing the first version of the
analytic framework with five elements: goals; stakeholders; processes and structure; re-
sources; and success and accountability).
4. Id. at 132.
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manage, learn from, and resolve streams of disputes or conflict.5 “A con-
flict, issue, dispute, or case submitted to any institution for managing con-
flict, including one labeled alternative or appropriate dispute resolution
(ADR), exists in the [institutional] context of a system of rules, processes,
steps, and forums.”6 DSD treats dispute resolution in context, as a pro-
cess step in a system rather than as a single case with standalone
processes, such as mediation, arbitration, or litigation. This section ad-
dresses an overview of DSD and applies it to the USPS REDRESS
program.
A. DISPUTE SYSTEM DESIGN
DSD emerged from the dispute resolution field when researchers be-
gan looking at effective conflict management as a system of practices and
processes.7 Ury, Brett, and Goldberg provided the term DSD, asserting
dispute resolution processes within the system will function better for the
stakeholders if they focus on interests or basic human needs, use rights-
based processes (e.g., arbitration) only as a fallback upon impasse, and
preferably avoid using power (e.g., strikes, war) if possible.8 Much DSD
literature focuses on design choices in the organizational context, in rela-
tion to external systems,9 and evolved toward integrative approaches.10
Early work on DSD focused on implementing new systems in federal
agencies and private sector companies. Costantino and Merchant were
leaders in implementing the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act
5. CATHY A. COSTANTINO & CHRISTINA SICKLES MERCHANT, DESIGNING CONFLICT
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: A GUIDE TO CREATING PRODUCTIVE AND HEALTHY ORGANIZA-
TIONS (1996); WILLIAM L. URY, JEANNE M. BRETT & STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, Getting
Disputes Resolved: Designing Systems to Cut the Costs of Conflict (1988); Smith & Marti-
nez, supra note 3, at 126.
6. Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Designing Justice: Legal Institutions and Other Systems
for Managing Conflict, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 2 (2008).
7. See generally DAVID W. EWING, JUSTICE ON THE JOB: RESOLVING GRIEVANCES IN
THE NONUNION WORKPLACE (1989); DOUGLAS M. MCCABE, CORPORATE NONUNION
COMPLAINT PROCEDURES AND SYSTEMS: A STRATEGIC HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGE-
MENT ANALYSIS (1988); Mary Rowe, Dispute Resolution in the Non-Union Environment:
An Evolution Toward Integrated Systems for Conflict Management?, in WORKPLACE DIS-
PUTE RESOLUTION: DIRECTIONS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 79 (Sandra E. Gleason ed., 1997);
Mary P. Rowe & Michael Baker, Are You Hearing Enough Employee Concerns? 62 HARV.
BUS. REV., May–June 1984, at 127 (examining multiple features, options for resolution
processes, access channels, and organizational supports that increase accessibility and con-
fidence in an organization’s conflict management); Mary P. Rowe, The Non-Union Com-
plaint System at M.I.T.: An Upward-Feedback Mediation Model, ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH
COST LITIGATION, Apr. 1984, at 10.
8. URY, BRETT, & GOLDBERG, supra note 5, at 3–19.
9. See KARL A. SLAIKEU & RALPH H. HASSON, CONTROLLING THE COSTS OF CON-
FLICT: HOW TO DESIGN A SYSTEM FOR YOUR ORGANIZATION (1998).
10. For a review, see John P. Conbere, Theory Building for Conflict Management Sys-
tem Design, 19 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 215 (2001). Integrated approaches include key fea-
tures such as being accessible to all people for dealing with the full range of problems in
the organization; accepting of dissent and encouraging of resolution at lower levels; many
ways to access the system; a variety of resolution choices; and support structures and
processes that fully integrate the system into the organization.
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(ADRA) of 1990 and 199611 in the federal public sector and applied orga-
nizational development theories to DSD advocating purposeful and stra-
tegic design and evaluation of conflict management systems.12 Agencies
have applied DSD at the federal, state, and local levels.13
Lipsky, Seeber, and Fincher developed a framework for analyzing or-
ganizational conflict management choices by grouping variables into en-
vironmental factors or organizational motivations that together give rise
to a conflict management strategy to contend, settle, or prevent work-
place conflict.14 They recommended that organizations employ a wide va-
riety of internal methods such as ombudspersons, peer mediators,
resolution facilitators, hotlines, and peer panels. Best practices permit
systems that accept dissent and encourage resolution at lower levels. Con-
temporary conflict management systems include choices from prevent-
ative and early problem solving, open door policies, coaching,
negotiation, and ombudsman support, to formal, rights-based solutions,
like arbitration and peer adjudication.15
DSD refers to both a process and an outcome. In the Analytic Frame-
work for DSD, Smith and Martinez propose examining a system’s goals,
stakeholders, processes and structure, resources, success and accountabil-
ity,16 context, and culture.17
B. DSD IN THE USPS REDRESS PROGRAM
In elements of the Analytic Framework for DSD, culture and context
include the legal and institutional framework within which a design oper-
ates. “The national REDRESS program provides mediation for equal
employment opportunity (EEO) disputes involving [USPS employee]
complaints of discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, and the Reha-
11. 5 U.S.C. §§ 571–584 (1996).
12. See COSTANTINO & MERCHANT, supra note 5. In a special issue in memory of
Christina Sickles Merchant, see David B. Lipsky, The Future of Conflict Management Sys-
tems, 33 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. S27 (Supp. 2015).
13. See JEFFREY M. SENGER, FEDERAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION: USING ADR WITH THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT (2004); Lisa B. Bingham & Charles R. Wise, The Adminis-
trative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990: How Do We Evaluate Its Success?, 6 J. PUB. ADMIN.
RES. & THEORY 383, 385 (1996); Tina Nabatchi, The Institutionalization of Alternative Dis-
pute Resolution in the Federal Government, 67 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 646, 646–47 (2007).
14. DAVID B. LIPSKY, RONALD L. SEEBER & RICHARD D. FINCHER, EMERGING SYS-
TEMS FOR MANAGING WORKPLACE CONFLICT: LESSONS FROM AMERICAN CORPORATIONS
FOR MANAGERS AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROFESSIONALS (2003).
15. CHARLES L. HOWARD, THE ORGANIZATIONAL OMBUDSMAN: ORIGINS, ROLES,
AND OPERATIONS: A LEGAL GUIDE (2010); Howard Gadlin, The Ombudsman: What’s in a
Name? 16 NEGOT. J. 37, 39 (2000); Lipsky, supra note 12, at S32; Jennifer F. Lynch, Beyond
ADR: A Systems Approach to Conflict Management, 17 NEGOT. J. 207, 208 (2001).
16. Smith & Martinez, supra note 3, at 132–33.
17. Lisa Blomgren Amsler, Janet K. Martinez & Stephanie E. Smith, Christina
Merchant and the State of Dispute System Design, 33 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. S7, S18–19
(Supp. 2015) (citing LISA BLOMGREN AMSLER, JANET K. MARTINEZ & STEPHANIE E.
SMITH, DISPUTE SYSTEM DESIGN: PREVENTING, MANAGING, AND RESOLVING CONFLICT
(forthcoming and on file with author)).
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bilitation Act of 1973.18” Together these laws “prohibit discrimination
based on race, sex, color, national origin, religion, age, and disability, and
also prohibit sexual or racial harassment or retaliation for raising a claim
of prohibited discrimination or harassment.”19 The USPS is not a federal
agency that receives a budgetary appropriation from Congress; it is a pub-
lic organization that generates revenue through fees for services.20 At the
inception of REDRESS, the USPS had over 800,000 employees nation-
wide;21 as one of many businesses disrupted by technology and the In-
ternet, the USPS employee population has declined and now stands at
approximately 509,000 career employees.22 The REDRESS Program
stemmed in part from the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which both authorized
new compensatory and punitive damages for employment discrimination
claims and jury trials for victims and at the same time explicitly en-
couraged disputants to use a wide variety of ADR processes.23 In 1994
when the program began, employees filed about 28,000 informal EEO
complaints a year, about half of which went on to the EEOC as formal
complaints. The REDRESS Program became the “largest employment
mediation program in the world (mediating over 1,000 disputes a month
across 90 different cities [by 2000]).”24 Indiana University “tracked and
evaluated [it] for over 12 years, from its initial pilot in 1994, through na-
tional implementation in 1998, until 2006.”25
18. Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Cynthia J. Hallberlin, Denise A. Walker & Won-Tae
Chung, Dispute System Design and Justice in Employment Dispute Resolution: Mediation at
the Workplace, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 25 (2009) [hereinafter Bingham et al.] (foot-
notes omitted) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (1991); 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2006); 29
USC §§ 701–718 (1991)).
19. Id.
20. The USPS is an “establishment of the executive branch of the Government of the
United States.” 39 U.S.C. § 201 (2012); see also U.S. Postal Serv. v. Flamingo Indus.
(USA), 540 U.S. 736 (2004).
21. Lisa B. Bingham & Lisa-Marie Napoli, Employment Dispute Resolution and Work-
place Culture: The REDRESS™ Program at the United States Postal Service, in FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION DESKBOOK 507, 507 (Marshall J. Breger et al.
eds., 2001).
22. See Size and Scope, USPS, https://about.usps.com/who-we-are/postal-facts/size-
scope.htm [https://perma.cc/FH8H-XNZN].
23. R. Gaull Silberman, Susan E. Murphy & Susan P. Adams, Alternative Dispute Res-
olution of Employment Discrimination Claims, 54 LA. L. REV. 1533, 1533 (1993). “Where
appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of alternative means of dispute
resolution, including settlement negotiations, conciliation, facilitation, mediation, factfind-
ing, minitrials, and arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes arising under the Acts or
provisions of Federal law amended by this title.” Id. (quoting a portion of Pub. L. 102-166,
105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.)).
24. Bingham et al., supra note 18, at 24.
25. Id. In 2006, financial circumstances at the USPS changed as a function of the Postal
Accountability and Enhancement Act of 2006, H.R. 6407, 109th Cong. (2006), a new fed-
eral law regarding prefunding for future retiree health insurance benefits. The immediate
result was to create a deficit. Lori Ann LaRocco, The Truth About the Post Office’s Finan-
cial Mess, CNBC (Oct. 24, 2011, 12:39 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/45018432 [https://
perma.cc/X3WE-RDJA]. Researchers and the USPS mutually agreed to end external data
collection. We do not here address in detail the early history, implementation, and manage-
ment of the program, which is documented and published elsewhere. See LISA B. BING-
HAM, IBM CENTER FOR THE BUSINESS OF GOVERNMENT, MEDIATION AT WORK:
TRANSFORMING WORKPLACE CONFLICT AT THE UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE (2003);
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Prior to REDRESS, “[t]he organizational structure of the USPS was
such that, given a choice, both supervisors and employees would litigate
through the traditional EEO process rather than mediate.”26 “The USPS
recognized that the named respondents to a complaint would be supervi-
sors in most cases.”27 Thus, to be successful, it had to design REDRESS
so that employees would prefer to mediate before pursuing litigation.28
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) had adopted
regulations requiring that ADR be voluntary.29 The Analytic Framework
for DSD examines a design’s structure and processes. The relevant RE-
DRESS structure and process choices include the timing of mediation
within two to four weeks of a complaint; location of mediation at the
workplace; creating a national and diverse roster of mediators with a vari-
ety of graduate training from multiple disciplines; the model for media-
tion a initially facilitative but later transformative,30 economic incentives
to participate on the clock or paid time; communications regarding the
program; training for key participants and stakeholders (union leadership
and managers); a national evaluation and transparency about the pro-
gram; and program management. These “were critical factors in encour-
aging employees to pursue mediation before litigation.”31
The Analytic Framework also examines stakeholders and their inter-
ests. At the USPS, this includes a broad range of people within the organ-
ization nationwide: the Board of Governors; Postmaster General; his or
her management team; regional and local managers; national, regional,
and local union leadership for seven national bargaining units; and staff
in the labor relations and EEO offices. It also includes the broader public
and congressional oversight committees. “The USPS conducted focus
groups with stakeholders as part of its initial design process, but did not
negotiate about the specifics of the program.”32 It also conducted broad
Bingham et al, supra note 18, at 26. The USPS continues to operate the REDRESS pro-
gram nationwide. See REDRESS, USPS, https://about.usps.com/what-we-are-doing/re-
dress/welcome.htm [https://perma.cc/E2ZA-SJ33]. This article addresses data from the
early national model of the program during 1998–2001.
26. For a detailed discussion of incentive structures related to REDRESS within the
USPS, see Tina Nabatchi & Lisa Blomgren Bingham, From Postal to Peaceful: Dispute
Systems Design in the USPS REDRESS Program, 30 REV. PUB. PERS. ADMIN. 211 (2010).
27. Bingham et al., supra note 18, at 26.
28. Id.
29. The ADRA of 1996 required that ADR be voluntary. See Federal Sector Alterna-
tive Dispute Resolution, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/
federal/adr/ [https://perma.cc/8YYS-FQCN] (last visited May 14, 2017). 5 U.S.C. § 572(c)
(1992) provides “[a]lternative means of dispute resolution authorized under this sub-
chapter are voluntary procedures which supplement rather than limit other available
agency dispute resolution techniques.” The EEOC implemented this for federal agencies
through voluntary settlement attempts. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.603 (1999).
30. See Joseph P. Folger & Robert A. Baruch Bush, Transformative Mediation and
Third-Party Intervention: Ten Hallmarks of a Transformative Approach to Practice, 13 ME-
DIATION Q. 263 (1996).
31. Bingham et al., supra note 18 at 26.
32. Id. As an EEO program, REDRESS was not a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 54–55 (1974). Moreover, the
same program applied across multiple bargaining units.
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training for stakeholders likely to participate in the program or its
administration.
The key system design features that continue to be part of the program
are that mediation is voluntary for the EEO complainant, but mandatory
for the supervisor who represents the USPS as an organizational entity.
As required by EEOC regulations, complainants are entitled to bring any
representative that they choose to the table. These can include lawyers,
union representatives, professional association representatives, family
members, co-workers, or friends. The USPS, as a party, also designates a
representative. The supervisor must have settlement authority, or be in
immediate telephone contact during the process with someone else in the
organization authorized to approve the settlement. Mediation occurs pri-
vately during work hours, and generally occurs within two to three weeks
of a request. That the national REDRESS program is voluntary for com-
plainants but mandatory for supervisors, is comparatively fast, and uses
outside mediators that meet stringent training requirements provided in-
centives for disputants to mediate.33
As to resources under the Analytic Framework, the USPS funded the
program and its management within EEO offices and initially the USPS
Law Department.34 It created the roster by identifying mediators nation-
wide with graduate education and at least ten cases of professional medi-
ation experience. The USPS REDRESS “Task Force created a national
roster of approximately 1,500 experienced mediators.”35 National out-
reach produced the most diverse roster then available, made up of 44%
women and 17% minorities,36 reflecting a fairly high level of racial
diversity.
Its regional EEO ADR staff members assigned mediators to individual
cases. It paid the full cost of mediator fees. In the final national model,
the mediators are independent contractors. As to accountability in terms
of transparency and evaluation, the USPS contracted with the Indiana
University School of Public and Environmental Affairs to conduct an ex-
ternal, independent evaluation by collecting exit surveys after each medi-
ation, brief mediator reports on each case, limited interview data, and
33. Bingham et al, supra note 18, at 26 (footnotes omitted) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1614.605
(1999)).
34. Cynthia J. Hallberlin, Transforming Workplace Culture Through Mediation: Les-
sons Learned from Swimming Upstream, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 375, 378 (2001)
(reporting 105 full-time positions for EEO ADR coordinators and $22 million budget).
35. See Traci G. Gann & Cynthia J. Hallberlin, Recruitment and Training Outside Neu-
trals, in FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION DESKBOOK 623, 627 (Marshall
J. Breger et al. eds., 2001).
36. The USPS did not limit the roster to mediators who were lawyers with substantive
employment law expertise since mediators were not expected to evaluate cases. Instead,
the roster included mediators from psychology, counseling, and social work, as well as
teachers, academics, human resource professionals, and retirees from these professions.
Many of the mediators had extensive experience in family and domestic relations practice.
See Bingham et al., supra note 18, at 27 n.123 (citing Gann & Hallberlin, supra note 35).
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analyses of archival data regarding case flow.37 This article addresses the
evaluation design and data collection in more detail with the methodol-
ogy for the instant data analysis of a sample infra.
There was an important limit on REDRESS data collection relevant to
this study. Due to the adverse history of its experience with previous re-
searchers on sensitive issues (e.g., drug testing), it was of utmost impor-
tance to ensure the confidentiality of all data collection even beyond a
level normally approved by university internal review boards for research
involving human subjects (i.e., reporting demographic data in the aggre-
gate with no personally identifiable information is permitted). Its concern
for confidentiality related to the perceptions of the program. It is a volun-
tary program; the USPS cannot coerce a complainant to participant.
Hence, the USPS prohibited data collection of participant demographics
in exit surveys or mediator tracking reports. Researchers did not collect
any personally identifiable information. There were no exit survey ques-
tions on race, sex, national origin, age, disability, religion, education level,
marital status, family status, specific location of employment, etc. In other
words, Indiana University was not able to analyze data using demo-
graphic information such as race or gender of mediation participants.
However, in an early version of the exit survey, the USPS did ask about
the nature of the claim in a case, such as purviews of race, sex, or national
origin discrimination, or racial or sexual harassment, and reverse discrim-
ination. For purposes of this article, we have inferred that the nature of
the claim is likely highly correlated with the claimant’s demographics. In
other words, where a complaint alleges race discrimination, we infer the
claimant likely was African-American or black. Where a complaint al-
leges reverse discrimination, we infer the claimant was Caucasian. Where
a complaint alleges sex discrimination, we infer the claimant was likely a
woman. Anecdotal accounts suggest few, if any, claims of sex discrimina-
tion by transgender or LGBTQ+ community members during this early
period of the program.38
For purposes of this article, key Analytic Framework issues are struc-
ture and processes in terms of the mediator roster and mediation model.
II. ACCOUNTABILITY IN DISPUTE SYSTEM DESIGN
One element of the Analytic Framework for DSD is accountability, de-
fined in terms of transparency, an evaluation component, and success.39
The system needs transparency in terms of operation, access, and results
to ensure credibility. It needs evaluation to judge whether it functions
effectively, its costs, its outcomes, and how to continue to improve its
design and implementation. Particularly relevant to the symposium,
37. For a comprehensive final report on USPS REDRESS data analysis and findings,
see Bingham et al., supra note 18.
38. Personal conversation with Cynthia J. Hallberlin, Tacoma Park, MD on June 10,
2017.
39. Smith & Martinez, supra note 3, at 132–33.
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Smith and Martinez ask, “Are neutrals failing to deliver quality services
or violating ethics rules? Are users satisfied with the options and services
provided?”40 However, there is a separate literature on accountability in
public affairs; it addresses the promise of justice. Yet, how do we define
justice? Much of the evaluation literature for courts and dispute systems
frames analyses in terms of procedural and distributive justice. This sec-
tion addresses these questions.
A. ACCOUNTABILITY IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS
In public affairs, accountability refers to the relationship between a
public servant or official and the duty they owe the public, elected offi-
cials, and their supervisors.41 Superiors or the public may call a public
servant to account for his or her actions to carry out the public will and
public values in public law. Accountability is an instrument for a higher
authority to exert control. There are two broad meanings for accountabil-
ity.42 First, accountability is a mechanism or means between an account-
giving party and an account-receiving party or forum. Second, accounta-
bility is a virtue for an institution and an end in itself. These two senses
are complementary. There are three key elements to accountability: in-
formation provided by the accountable party, discussion between the ac-
countable party and the oversight body, and the consequences for the
accountable party.43 Public administration scholars have deepened theory
on accountability by arguing institutions make six possible accountability
promises that are either means or ends.44 “There are three promises of
instrumental value: control (inputs), ethical behavior/choices (processes),
and performance (outcomes)” and “three promises of intrinsic value: in-
tegrity (inputs), legitimacy (processes), and justice (outcomes).”45
“Dubnick and Frederickson explain that the promise of justice ‘assumes
the opportunity to seek justice in light of some claimed act or possible act
40. Id. at 132.
41. Lisa Blomgren Amsler & Jessica Sherrod, Accountability Forums and Dispute Sys-
tem Design, 40 PUB. PERFORMANCE & MGMT. REV. 529, 529–30 (2017).
42. Mark Bovens, Two Concepts of Accountability: Accountability As a Virtue and As
a Mechanism, 33 WEST EUR. POL. 946, 946–48 (2010).
43. Gijs Jan Brandsma & Thomas Schillemans, The Accountability Cube: Measuring
Accountability, 23 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 953, 955–56 (2013).
44. Melvin J. Dubnick & H. George Frederickson, Accountable Agents: Federal Per-
formance Measurement and Third-Party Government, 20 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY
i143, i144–45 (2009) [hereinafter Dubnick & Frederickson (2009)]; Melvin J. Dubnick & H.
George Frederickson, Introduction: The Promises of Accountability Research, in ACCOUNT-
ABLE GOVERNMENT: PROBLEMS AND PROMISES xiii, xiii–xvii (Melvin J. Dubnick & H.
George Frederickson eds., 2011) [hereinafter Dubnick & Frederickson (2011)]; Melvin J.
Dubnick & Kaifeng Yang, The Pursuit of Accountability: Promise, Problems, and Pros-
pects, in THE STATE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: ISSUES, CHALLENGES, AND OPPORTUNI-
TIES 171, 172–76 (Donald C. Menzel & Harvey L. White eds., 2011).
45. Amsler & Sherrod, supra note 41, at 531 (citing Melvin J. Dubnick, Seeking Salva-
tion for Accountability (Am. Political Sci. Ass’n, 2002); Dubnick & Frederickson (2009),
supra note 44; Dubnick & Frederickson (2011), supra note 44; MELVIN J. DUBNICK & H.
GEORGE FREDERICKSON, PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY: PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT, THE
EXTENDED STATE, AND THE SEARCH FOR TRUST (2011); Dubnick & Yang, supra note 44).
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[that] will result in justice or fairness’ and also refer to it as ‘justice or
equity.’”46 They relate this promise to judicial settings that provide due
process. The promise of justice also includes social equity in management
decisions enforcing policies. Scholars observe “these promises are built
on assumptions”; “the link between account giving and each promise [is]
uncertain.”47
In downstream quasi-judicial processes like ADR programs, the ac-
count-giving disputants seek to resolve a conflict over their rights and
responsibilities in an accountability forum.48 Accountability forums are
DSDs, from the familiar trial court or administrative agency adjudication
to the less formal ADR forums like mediation and arbitration. “DSD fo-
cuses on more than a single case; it entails designing and evaluating the
forum for a stream of cases within a system.”49
“Within the context of DSD, justice is a core concern.”50 People value
the accountability forum for delivering justice, an intrinsic promise.
Dubnick defines “the promise of justice as ‘access to impartial arenas
where abuses of authority can be challenged and judged’”;51 he “incorpo-
rates criteria for judging the forum . . . [as] impartiality as to the dispu-
tants and the substance of the dispute, due process, standing to raise the
challenge, and a judgment or decision. . . . [T]he link between the mecha-
nism and the promise depends on whether system participants can trust
the accountability forum, a [DSD], as fair and just.”52
There is little empirical research on the connection between accounta-
bility mechanisms and just outcomes or individual perceptions of justice.
Generally, public affairs scholars have focused research more on public
management and public policy programs; there is relatively little research
on the quasi-judicial work of agencies and the few programs that use
ADR in administrative enforcement.53
B. HOW SHOULD WE DEFINE THE PROMISE OF JUSTICE?
Public affairs scholars have yet to fully develop the term justice in the
accountability promise of justice. For example, “access to impartial are-
nas where abuses of authority can be challenged and judged”54 essentially
defines justice as a process. Justice as equity defines it as outcome. Schol-
ars from economics, law, philosophy, political science, and psychology
46. Id. (internal citation omitted) (citing Dubnick & Frederickson, Accountable
Agents, supra note 44, at i145).
47. Id. (citing Dubnick & Yang, supra note 44, at 174).
48. Amsler & Sherrod, supra note 41, at 529–30.
49. Id. at 531.
50. Id.
51. Id. (citing Melvin Dubnick, Accountability and the Promise of Performance: In
Search of the Mechanisms, 28 PUB. PERFORMANCE & MGMT. REV. 376, 376 (2005)).
52. Id. (discussing Dubnick & Yang, supra note 44).
53. Id. at 529–30.
54. Dubnick, supra note 51, at 376.
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provide many analyses and conceptions of justice.55 How do conceptions
of justice apply to the design of forums of accountability? Do they pro-
vide different underlying norms for fairness? To measure and judge ac-
countability in DSD, we have to examine varying conceptions of justice
embodied in various DSDs.
The Analytic Framework for DSD includes goals as one of the six cate-
gories for analysis. Goals may suggest which definition of justice applies,
expressly or implicitly, to a DSD. The many conceptions of justice for
DSD fall into roughly five categories56: (A) justice as to outcomes, in-
cluding substantive, distributive, utilitarian, and social justice; (B) justice
as to processes, including voice and procedural justice; (C) justice within
organizations, including organizational, interactional, informational, and
interpersonal justice; (D) justice for people living in a community, includ-
ing corrective, retributive, deterrent, restorative, transitional, communi-
tarian, and communicative justice; and (E) injustice in various settings
and processes. These categories simplify the array of definitions, which
are not mutually exclusive. Procedural justice is the dominant theoretical
frame for evaluations of, or research on, agency adjudicatory systems for
civil enforcement and organizational justice for agency mediation of
workplace disputes. Distributive justice frames how some researchers as-
sess outcomes in adjudication and courts, including agency litigation. All
three represent forums of accountability.
For justice as process, we must examine how an agency has designed
the process, such as the specific nature of access (on paper or in person),
nature of the process for raising the challenge (adjudicatory, consensus-
based, or negotiated), or its timing before or after agency action. As an
example of a decision process, one definition of perfect procedural justice
might include a throw of the dice or the random draw of a draft number
in the Vietnam War. For justice as outcome, the rule of law provides deci-
sion standards that determine the substance of what a disputant achieves
or receives, such as at-will employment, a statutory standard for discrimi-
nation like Title VII, or a burden and standard of proof like preponder-
ance of the evidence or beyond a reasonable doubt that define when
someone is guilty.
The REDRESS exit surveys contained questions drawn from procedu-
ral and distributive justice literature, as well as organizational justice liter-
ature, including interactional and informational justice.57 These questions
assess mediation as a forum of accountability;58 in this forum, the USPS is
accountable for discrimination by its employees as agents of the
organization.
55. A comprehensive analysis of the justice literature is outside the scope of this arti-
cle. For a more comprehensive review, see Bingham, supra note 6, at 2.
56. Adapted from a more detailed discussion. Id. at 33–46.
57. Tina Nabatchi et al., Organizational Justice and Workplace Mediation: A Six Factor
Model, 18 INT’L J. CONFLICT MGMT. 148 (2007).
58. Lisa Blomgren Amsler & Jessica Sherrod, Accountability Forums and Dispute Sys-
tem Design, 40 PUB. PERFORMANCE & MGMT. REV. 529, 529–30 (2017).
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III. REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY: ANOTHER TOOL
FOR LOOKING AT DSD, ACCOUNTABILITY,
AND BIAS
Public affairs scholars have explored the role of demographic represen-
tativeness in bureaucracy, meaning the composition of the government
workforce in relation to the general public it serves.59 While related in
some respects to literature regarding the contribution a more diverse
workforce makes to business success,60 this literature stems from the role
bureaucracy plays in serving the public, particularly in a democracy. Does
representative bureaucracy theory suggest another way to consider bias
in ADR generally, and mediation specifically, as informal dispute resolu-
tion? In the USPS REDRESS Program, mediators are independent con-
tractors; the USPS hires and pays them for individual cases once they are
on the REDRESS roster. In this capacity, while not public employees like
administrative law judges who mediate as settlement judges, they never-
theless serve an analogous function. Because the USPS is a federal organ-
ization, it handles the informal complaint and conciliation stages of Title
VII in house; formal complaints go to the EEOC. Mediators serve a pub-
lic role; the diversity of the profession is a public policy issue that receives
continuing attention. This section briefly reviews representative bureau-
cracy and its relationship to selected legal scholarship on diversity in the
mediator and arbitrator professions.
A. PASSIVE, ACTIVE, AND SYMBOLIC REPRESENTATIVE
BUREAUCRACY
Representative bureaucracy theory has examined passive, active, and
symbolic representation. Passive representativeness, also called descrip-
tive representation,61 examines the representative ratio or percentage of
women, racial, and ethnic minorities in government bureaucracy com-
pared to the general population: “A representative ratio of 1.0 indicated
perfect representation; anything below 1.0 suggested that the bureaucracy
underrepresented those groups in the general population; and anything
above 1.0 connoted overrepresentation.”62 Researchers have found that
even when there is good passive representation, it is hierarchical, mean-
ing representation is stratified within the organization by rank or pay
grade.63 Alternatively, passive representation is stratified by functions so
59. See generally Norma M. Riccucci & Gregg G. Van Ryzin, Representative Bureau-
cracy: A Lever to Enhance Social Equity, Coproduction, and Democracy, 77 PUB. ADMIN.
REV. 21 (2017) (presenting a current and comprehensive review of the literature on repre-
sentative bureaucracy in public affairs).
60. See, e.g., Cedric Herring, Does Diversity Pay?: Race, Gender, and the Business
Case for Diversity, 74 AM. SOC. REV. 208 (2009).
61. Brandy Kennedy, Unraveling Representative Bureaucracy: A Systematic Analysis of
the Literature, 46 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 395, 401–03 (2014).
62. Riccucci & Van Ryzin, supra note 59, at 22 (citing Norma M. Riccucci & Judith R.
Saidel, The Representativeness of State-Level Bureaucratic Leaders, 57 PUB. ADMIN. REV.
423 (1997)).
63. Id.
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that it is lower in higher level jobs but higher in jobs deemed traditionally
associated with women (nursing, education) or minorities (housing, wel-
fare).64 There is greater diversity overall of the federal public service in
race, gender, ethnicity, and ability but less at the highest levels.65
Active representativeness asks whether representativeness corresponds
with values that “translate into better policy and administrative outcomes
for [the] underrepresented group.”66 In other words, its premise is that
race, ethnicity, and gender matter in policy and decision-making. Women
advocate for policy for women. People hold more favorable opinions of
others based on group identity. Some studies suggest that active represen-
tation is more likely at lower street bureaucrat than higher policy-making
levels.67
Symbolic representativeness suggests that the mere presence of passive
representation promotes trust in and legitimacy of government.
Much dispute resolution practice occurs in state or federal public agen-
cies or courts, or in analogous quasi-public institutions like community
mediation centers. Little of the representative bureaucracy research in
public affairs has addressed the quasi-judicial work of executive branch
agencies or the judiciary. Empirical research on representativeness has
examined passive, active, and symbolic representation. For example, it
has focused on active representativeness in police interaction with the
public and found that active representation by female police improve out-
comes for women in sexual assault cases;68 passive representativeness in
terms of race reduces citizen complaints about police;69 and symbolic rep-
resentativeness improves trust in public officials.70
64. Id.
65. Id. (citing U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) studies reporting a
workforce of 2.045 million, 1.159 million men and 0.886 million women, and all minorities
constitute a total of 35%, black 17.7%, and Hispanic 8.4%. Interestingly, OPM studies
report a reduction in women’s salary gap: in the federal sector, it is 87% instead of 77% of
average men’s salaries).
66. Id. at 23 (citing Kenneth J. Meier & Jill Nicholson-Crotty, Gender, Representative
Bureaucracy, and Law Enforcement: The Case of Sexual Assault, 66 PUB. ADMIN. REV.
850, 858 (2006)) (reporting studies finding that women working in a bureaucracy are more
likely than male coworkers to push for programs and issues that benefit women in the
general population).
67. See generally Rhys Andrews, Rachel Ashworth & Kenneth J. Meier, Representa-
tive Bureaucracy and Fire Service Performance, 17 INT’L PUB. MGMT. J. 1 (2014) (exploring
the relationship between gender and minority ethnic representation and the performance
of fire authorities in England and finding more representative authorities have more effec-
tive performance).
68. Meier & Nicholson-Crotty, supra note 66, at 857–58.
69. Riccucci & Van Ryzin, supra note 59, at 24 (citing Sounman Hong, Does Increasing
Ethnic Representativeness Reduce Police Misconduct? Evidence from Police Reform in En-
gland and Wales, 77 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 195 (2017)).
70. Nick A. Theobald & Donald P. Haider-Markel, Race, Bureaucracy, and Symbolic
Representation: Interactions Between Citizens and Police, 19 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THE-
ORY 409, 417 (2009) (finding that the presence of African-American police officers in-
creases African-American residents’ trust of the police). But see Sean Nicholson-Crotty,
Jill Nicholson-Crotty & Sergio Fernandez, Will More Black Cops Matter? Officer Race and
Police-Involved Homicides of Black Citizens, 77 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 206, 213–14 (2017)
(finding support for representative bureaucracy theory that hiring more black police of-
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What about judges, administrative law judges, arbitrators, and
mediators? Specifically, what relevance or impact is the bureaucratic rep-
resentativeness of mediators and arbitrators, particularly in race, ethnic-
ity, and gender discrimination cases? What role does their race, ethnicity,
or gender play, if any? What role should it play? The accountability liter-
ature suggests that when effectively acting as public officials in accounta-
bility forums, mediators should be impartial and maintain fair process.
Mediators practice not only independently or through third-party rosters,
but as employees in court ADR programs. This might suggest they are
ethically bound to avoid active representativeness. Passive and symbolic
representation would not pose a similar problem in an accountability fo-
rum requiring impartial neutrals.
B. DIVERSITY IN THE ADR PROFESSION AND REPRESENTATIVE
BUREAUCRACY
Early commentary on ADR did not address issues of race, ethnicity, or
gender demographics in its practice, either in terms of mediators or medi-
ation participants.71 The ADR profession called for more diversity in me-
diation and arbitration rosters; the mediation profession is comprised
mostly of white men.72 The founders and practitioners of restorative jus-
tice, a form of mediation, too are mostly white men; critics point out the
paradox that restorative justice is little practiced for race with our racial-
ized criminal justice system.73 Scholars have long since observed that the
language and purported objective criteria regarding the justice system
and ADR are gendered and would benefit from developing a feminist
voice.74
Researchers who have conducted empirical studies disagree on the ac-
tual role that mediator demographics play. Some studies examine media-
tion participants’ demographics, while others examine those of the
neutrals; few look at both participants and mediators. Representative bu-
reaucracy theorizes about the relationship between those in the bureau-
cracy and those they serve in terms of demographics, suggesting passive,
active, and symbolic representation have a positive effect on the public
that their servants serve. This study focuses primarily on that relationship
as to race and gender. For a comprehensive review of the impact of race
and gender in dispute resolution processes, we defer to other articles in
ficers may reduce police violence against black citizens but only once the percentage of
blacks on the force is high enough to reach critical mass).
71. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anath-
ema?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668 (1986); Frank E.A. Sander, Alternative Methods of Dispute
Resolution: An Overview, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 1 (1985).
72. For a discussion and review of recent commentary on the absence of racial diver-
sity in mediation, a profession comprised mostly of white men, see Art Hinshaw, Regulat-
ing Mediators, 21 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 163 (2016).
73. See Theo Gavrielides, Bringing Race Relations into the Restorative Justice Debate:
An Alternative and Personalized Vision of “the Other”, 45 J. BLACK STUD. 216 (2014).
74. Eve Hill, Alternative Dispute Resolution in a Feminist Voice, 5 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 337 (1990).
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this symposium.75 However, a few studies are particularly relevant to our
attempt to address this question as to the USPS REDRESS Program.
In general, findings have been mixed. In social psychology, Tyler and
Lind have inspired numerous studies of dispute processing framed by
procedural justice theory.76 In the classic study of litigation and ADR,
Lind and co-authors found that litigants’ race, gender, income, or em-
ployment status did not affect procedural justice and outcome satisfaction
ratings of trial, arbitration, bilateral settlement, and settlement confer-
ences in three different trial courts.77 Subsequent studies found differ-
ences in preferences for ADR procedures based on ethnicity and gender,
but these differences are small in comparison to an overall and shared
pattern of preferring persuasion and negotiation to other procedures.78
Cross-cultural studies found gender differences in preferences for adver-
sary compared to non-adversary procedures depending on the status of
the investigator; the theory suggested Americans would prefer adversary
procedures as more competitive when compared to Chinese students, and
women were less competitive than men depending on context and more
likely to prefer non-adversary procedures.79 The National REDRESS
Evaluation Project at Indiana University used procedural justice to frame
data collection and analysis as a way to ensure program accountability
and performance. However, prior to this study, there was no published
analysis of REDRESS data using demographics of USPS employees,
their representatives, or mediators.
In contrast to studies using procedural justice theory to judge partici-
pant perceptions in litigation and ADR, other studies look at mediator
demographics in relation to their impact on likelihood of settlement or
settlement outcome. For example, one study found that having a female
mediator increased the likelihood of settlement by almost five percentage
points.80 The National REDRESS Evaluation Project collected exit sur-
75. See Charles B. Craver, Do Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedures Disadvan-
tage Women and Minorities?, 70 SMU L. REV. 891 (2017); Michael Z. Green, Reconsider-
ing Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution for Black Work Matters, 70 SMU L. REV.
639 (2017); Carol Izumi, Implicit Bias and Prejudice in Mediation, 70 SMU L. REV. 681
(2017); Andrea Schneider, Negotiating While Female, 70 SMU L. REV. 695 (2017).
76. See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDU-
RAL JUSTICE (1988).
77. E. Allan Lind, Robert J. MacCoun, Patricia A. Ebener, William L.F. Felstiner,
Deborah R. Hensler, Judith Resnik & Tom R. Tyler, In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Liti-
gants’ Evaluations of Their Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
953, 966 (1990).
78. E. Allan Lind, Yuen J. Huo & Tom R. Tyler, . . . And Justice for All: Ethnicity,
Gender, and Preferences for Dispute Resolution Procedures, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 269,
279 (1994) (ethnicity was defined as African-American, Hispanic-American, Asian-Ameri-
can, and European-American).
79. Kwok Leung & E. Allan Lind, Procedural Justice and Culture: Effects of Culture,
Gender, and Investigator Status on Procedural Preferences, 50 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1134, 1138 (1986) (researchers theorized that women are less competitive with
high status authority figures and thus more likely to prefer non-adversary procedures in
that context).
80. Barry Edwards, Renovating the Multi-Door Courthouse: Designing Trial Court
Dispute Resolution Systems to Improve Results and Control Costs, 18 HARV. NEGOT. L.
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vey data on participant perceptions and qualitative data from interviews.
The exit surveys had employee self-reports on outcomes; however, com-
parisons of complainant and respondent exit surveys, when matched on
the same case, revealed differing perceptions and reports on the out-
come.81 Thus, we could not use this data source for analyses of objective
mediation outcomes. There was no analysis of mediator characteristics
and settlement.
There are few studies that put together mediation participants and
mediators in terms of demographics and compare mediated and litigated
outcomes. The first such study is anecdotally known as the MetroCourt
Study.82 In 1990–1991, using multivariate analyses of demographic and
outcome data on mediated small-claims court civil cases, researchers sys-
tematically explored the hypothesis that people with less social power,
defined by race, class, and gender, do worse in formal and informal legal
systems.83 Citing, among others, Richard Delgado, who inspired this sym-
posium, they specifically tested (1) “the ‘disparity’ hypothesis that minor-
ity and female disputants will achieve poorer outcomes . . . whether their
cases are mediated or adjudicated,” and (2) the “informality hypothesis”
that the results will be worse for minority and female disputants in media-
tion than litigation.84 They theorized that “low visibility and lack of for-
mal rules and structures in mediation, facilitated settlement, and other
relatively informal processes reduce the rights of less powerful partici-
pants.”85 Researchers used cases from a state court and local community
mediation center with mediators who had received standard forty-hour
mediation training; the mediators practiced in a co-mediation model in
which mediators were pairs of women, men, or mixed gender, and pairs
of minority, nonminority, and mixed ethnicity.86 Both judge and mediator
pools were diverse. In general, Anglo male claimants received a greater
proportion of their claim than other ethnic or gender groups in both adju-
dicated and mediated cases.87 In adjudicated cases, minority men and An-
REV. 281, 305 (2013). This rigorous study used multivariate regression analysis to examine
the impact of a number of system design features on likelihood of settlement; the author
observed: “The independent impact of a mediator’s gender on the likelihood of settlement
remains significant despite a host of control variables. Ceteris paribus, the selection of a
female mediator significantly increases the likelihood of settlement.” Id. at 312.
81. Rebecca Nesbit, Tina Nabatchi & Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Employees, Supervi-
sors, and Workplace Mediation: Experiences of Justice and Settlement, 32 REV. PUB. PERS.
ADMIN. 260, 267–80 (2012).
82. The original report is MICHELLE HERMANN, GARY LAFREE, CHRISTINE RACK &
MARY BETH WEST, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE EFFECTS OF RACE AND GENDER ON
SMALL CLAIMS ADJUDICATION AND MEDIATION (1993) (a variety of Google searches
failed to turn up an accessible copy of this report, including a search of the University of
New Mexico website). However, the data from this report was re-analyzed and reported in
Gary LaFree & Christine Rack, The Effects of Participants’ Ethnicity and Gender on Mone-
tary Outcomes in Mediated and Adjudicated Civil Cases, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 767 (1996),
upon which the following discussion exclusively relies.
83. Id. at 768.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 769.
86. Id. at 771.
87. Id. at 776.
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glo women claimants received less than Anglo men; in mediated cases,
minority women and men claimants received less than Anglo men.88
However, when compared as respondents—not claimants—in mediation,
there were no significant differences between Anglo male respondents
and other respondents. Results for respondents in adjudication were
mixed. In multivariate analyses controlling for a number of objective case
factors, the authors concluded that there was considerable support for
Galanter’s repeat player hypothesis; in general, white males were more
likely to be repeat players and minorities and women more likely to be
one-shot players, except for white females in mediation.89 They had some
support for the informality hypothesis in mediation.90 In other words,
gender and ethnicity are associated with a number of one-shot player dis-
advantages in the civil justice system.
The MetroCourt Study also analyzed the impact of matching mediator
demographics with those of participants. The main results show that, al-
though recovery for claimants is lower overall when both mediators are
minorities, it is significant that minority male and female claimants do
better in their recovery ratio than with Anglo mediators.91 In contrast,
mediator pairs with at least one Anglo resulted in significantly higher re-
coveries for Anglo claimants than minorities, while minority mediator
pairs resulted in comparable recoveries across ethnicities.92 There were
also significant gender effects. Anglo women claimants received higher
recoveries and minority male respondents paid out more when the medi-
ator pair was comprised of a woman and a man; yet, minority women
claimants received statistically significantly lower recoveries when both
mediators in the pair were women.93 In mediation, Anglo women did bet-
ter as respondents than Anglo men. In general, there was limited support
for the informality hypothesis in mediation. However, there was support
for the disparity hypothesis in the pattern of lower recoveries for minority
claimants from Anglo respondents.94
Charkoudian and Wayne analyzed conflict behavior, mediator behav-
ior, and the interaction between mediator and participant gender or me-
diator and participant racial or ethnic group.95 In their literature review,
they conclude that most research shows “no relationship between media-
tor gender and measures of mediation success such as settlement rate,
participants’ perception of the fairness of mediation, and satisfaction with
88. Id. at 776–77.
89. Id. at 781.
90. Id. at 780–81.
91. Id. at 786.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 789.
95. Lorig Charkoudian & Ellen Kabcenell Wayne, Fairness, Understanding, and Satis-
faction: Impact of Mediator and Participant Race and Gender on Participants’ Perception of
Mediation, 28 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 23, 24 (2010).
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the mediation process or outcome.”96 However, Charkoudian and Wayne
express concern that the research on demographics in mediation “over-
simplifies the concept of group identification.”97 They examine what hap-
pened when mediators and one or both participants matched either by
gender and racial or ethnic backgrounds.98 They found that when media-
tor and participant share the same gender, there is more communication
between the two, possibly due to shared and gendered communication
behaviors. However, they reported significant findings by looking at cases
where the participant and mediator did not match by gender and the me-
diator’s gender matched that of the other party:
Participants who attended a mediation with no same-gender media-
tor present saw the mediator(s) as listening judgmentally and as tak-
ing sides in the mediation. When the participant was outnumbered in
the mediation session because the mediator’s gender matched only
that of the opponent, these perceived bias effects worsened. Media-
tion participants with no gender match were also less satisfied with
the mediation process.99
This suggests that, in practice, ADR program managers should con-
sider either matching mediators by gender, co-mediation models where
one mediator matches each disputant, or assignments where the media-
tor’s gender matches neither disputant.
In contrast, matching participant and mediator by racial or ethnic iden-
tity had little or no impact on perceptions of mediation fairness or media-
tor ability and fairness.100 However, when a participant was outnumbered
by a mediator and other participant of a different racial or ethnic identity,
it did affect the outnumbered participant’s perceptions about the likeli-
hood “that [the] conflict can be dealt with productively.”101
In sum, the empirical work on demographics in mediation varies widely
in research design and has produced mixed results. The MetroCourt Study
uncovered systemic patterns of bias in adjudication and mediation when
examining patterns by demographics, but when they control with repeat
player case factors, many effects disappear, probably because gender and
ethnicity correlate with one-shot player status, which also correlates with
lower economic power. Charkoudian and Wayne did not directly address
actual patterns of bias in outcomes but reached perceptions of bias. It has
96. Id. at 27 (citing Jess K. Alberts, Brian L. Heisterkamp & Robert M. McPhee, Dis-
putant Perceptions of and Satisfaction with a Community Mediation Program, 16 INT’L J.
CONFLICT MGMT. 218 (2005); Peter J.D. Carnevale, Rodney G. Lim & Mary E. McLaugh-
lin, Contingent Mediator Behavior and Its Effectiveness, in MEDIATION RESEARCH: THE
PROCESS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION 213 (Kenneth Kressel,
Dean G. Pruitt & Associates eds., 1989); Roselle L. Wissler, The Role of Antecedent and
Procedural Characteristics in Mediation: A Review of Research, in THE BLACKWELL HAND-
BOOK OF MEDIATION: BRIDGING THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE 129 (Margaret S.
Herrman ed., 2006)).
97. Id. at 45.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 44.
100. Id. at 45.
101. Id.
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produced practice recommendations aimed at reducing these perceptions.
Both studies suggest support for greater diversity on mediator rosters,
which we might also construe as greater passive or symbolic representa-
tive bureaucracy. Greater roster diversity and matching mediator
demographics to participants may improve ADR program management
and practice. However, it is also a guide to creating the appearance of
fairness when the actuality may be otherwise.
This suggests we continue to need systemic level analyses of outcomes
controlling for demographic variables that include and disentangle the ef-
fects of gender, racial, or ethnic identity of both participants and
mediators. Returning to the Analytic Framework for DSD, this also sug-
gests that best practices include a transparent program evaluation as an
accountability system that regularly collects and reports such data by
demographics in the aggregate as a measure of the system’s performance.
Given the mixed findings in past research on mediator and/or disputant
demographics, we do not suggest specific hypotheses. Instead, this repre-
sents preliminary research.
IV. REDRESS DATA: SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY
The USPS began national implementation of REDRESS on January 1,
1998 and completed it by July 1, 1999.
The evaluation design entailed collecting data from multiple indepen-
dent sources and using both qualitative and quantitative methods.
Sources included participants, their representatives, non-participant em-
ployees, the mediators, program administrators, and archival datasets. In-
diana University designed two instruments in collaboration with the
USPS to track and assess the program: the participant exit survey and a
data tracking form. Both of these forms were used from the inception of
the national program until 2006, when Indiana University concluded its
data collection.102
A. EXIT SURVEY DATA AND ITS LIMITATIONS
“The confidential exit survey collected information about each party’s
role (complainant, supervisor, or a representative of either the complain-
ant or supervisor), position (supervisor, manager, or craft employee), and
if applicable, the nature of the representative (attorney, union official,
coworker, or other such as friend or family member).”103 As previously
addressed, the exit survey asked no questions regarding participant
demographics, including race, ethnicity, national origin, sex or gender,
age, or ability.104 The survey asked whether the dispute was fully, par-
tially, or not resolved, and measured the participants’ satisfaction with
102. Bingham et al, supra note 18, at 27–28.
103. Id. The survey was distributed by mediators at the close of the session and mailed
directly to researchers.
104. The USPS Law Department determined that it would not publish analyses by
demographic category due in part to a negative past experience related to an outside evalu-
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the process, mediator, and outcome using a five-point Likert scale, which
ranges from very satisfied/strongly agree to very dissatisfied/strongly disa-
gree.105 “Additional measures assessed the ‘transformative’ aspects of the
model as implemented in the program, such as questions addressing dis-
putant empowerment and recognition and mediator behaviors.”106 These
data provided the basis for a wide variety of analyses.
The exit survey and mediator tracking report were part of the DSD of
REDRESS. Both contained national zip codes. The USPS tracked pro-
gram results by geographic region, and the Indiana Conflict Resolution
Institute did periodic analyses for program administrators. This enabled
the USPS to create incentives for regional program managers to increase
participation. In addition, all participants in the system were conscious of
the continuous outside evaluation, giving the program internal
credibility.107
This article analyzes procedural justice indicators on the exit surveys.
Important for the analysis that follows, there was a question in the exit
survey during a limited time period for participants to report the nature
of the discrimination claim, also known technically as purview:
What was the nature of the EEO complaint in this case? Circle all
that apply, and please specify on the space provided.
1. Race _____
2. Color ____
3. Reverse Discrimination (white) ____
4. National Origin ____
5. Sex Discrimination ____
6. Sexual Harassment ____





However, this question appeared only on the early versions of the exit
survey, prior to national implementation of the transformative mediation
model. Evaluators published procedural justice analyses of this early exit
survey.108 This question permitted researchers to consider how mediator
demographics interact with the nature of an employment discrimination
ator publishing drug-testing results in the aggregate but by demographic category. Personal
conversation with Cynthia J. Hallberlin (May 15, 2017).
105. Bingham et al., supra note 18, at 28 (citing Tina Nabatchi et al., Organizational
Justice and Workplace Mediation: A Six Factor Model, 18 INT’L J. CONFLICT MGMT. 148
(2007)). For a review of the procedural and organizational justice literature and a factor
analysis examining and validating the relationship of survey indicators to this literature, see
Nabatchi et al., supra. “These measures are common and have a strong theoretical founda-
tion in procedural justice research on mediation.” Id. at 28 n.127.
106. Id. at 28.
107. Id. at 29.
108. See Lisa B. Bingham, Mediating Employment Disputes: Perceptions of Redress at
the United States Postal Service, 17 REV. PUB. PERS. ADMIN. 20 (1997).
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claim to shape claimants’ perceptions of procedural and distributive jus-
tice. We argue here that, given the time period in which the participants
completed these exit surveys (1997–1999), it is reasonable to infer aspects
of the complainant’s demographics from the nature of the claim. We infer
that in claims of race discrimination, the claimant is likely African-Ameri-
can. In claims of sex discrimination and sexual harassment, the claimant is
likely female. Due to our limited sample size, we are unable to conduct
meaningful chi-square analyses on claims involving discrimination based
on color, national origin, reverse discrimination, or other categories.
These are limitations on the dataset.
Employees could answer more than one purview or nature of claim in
the question above. It is possible for a complainant to circle both sex
discrimination and sexual harassment, for example. For purposes of anal-
ysis, we broke out all claims within a given purview, such as race discrimi-
nation, regardless of whether the complainant circled additional
purviews. Thus, the percentages of exit surveys reported by purview
alone sum to more than 100%. The following information concerns per-
centages based on the total number of purviews indicated on exit surveys
used prior to the national rollout and containing the question regarding
nature of claim or purview. In approximately 20% of the total, race was
one of the purviews and the highest category of claim reported. Approxi-
mately 12% of the total claims were for discrimination based on the pur-
views color, national origin, or reverse discrimination as being the nature.
In roughly 17% of the total, participants reported claims of either sexual
discrimination or sexual harassment as a purview.
B. MEDIATOR SURVEY DATA AND ITS LIMITATIONS
To ensure that REDRESS was implemented as designed, evaluators
also designed a mediator survey, which sought to evaluate all mediators
who participated in the REDRESS program from April 1998 until July
2001 against the ten hallmarks of mediation.109 Administered by mail, the
mediator survey measured how frequently they employed different trans-
formative and directive/evaluative behaviors in their mediation sessions.
Important for the purposes of the analysis that follows, researchers in-
cluded at the end of the mediator survey a demographic section asking
mediators to self-report their gender, age, race, and education level.
Eleven hundred and thirty (N=1130) mediators reported either their race
or gender. Approximately 48% (N=547) of the mediators were female
and around 52% (N=582) were male. An overwhelming majority of the
mediators—approximately 83% (N=940)—were Caucasian. Approxi-
mately 11% (N=128) were African-American, and the remaining
mediators who responded to the survey were Asian-American (0.1%,
N=8), Native American (0.1%, N=7), Latino (2.3%, N=26), or another
109. See Joseph P. Folger & Robert A. Baruch Bush, Transformative Mediation and
Third-Party Intervention: Ten Hallmarks of a Transformative Approach to Practice, 13 ME-
DIATION Q. 263 (1996).
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non-listed race (0.94%, N=21). The following table summarizes the medi-
ator demographics as self-reported in the mediator survey.
Table A. Demographics of REDRESS Mediators.
No Gender
Female Male Self-Reported % of Total
Caucasian 452 487 1 83.19%
African-American 67 61 0 11.33%
Asian-American 6 2 0 0.1%
Native American 5 2 0 0.1%
Latino 11 15 0 2.3%
Other 6 15 0 1.9%
The mediator roster and mediator survey provided data for matching
mediator demographics to exit surveys on cases they mediated. For pur-
poses of this analysis, researchers pulled a sample of all complainant exit
surveys that contain both this question and a mediator code allowing re-
searchers to connect the exit survey to an individual mediator for whom
there is demographic information.110 There were 1,388 complainant exit
surveys for which we had both the question of nature of claim or purview
and the identity of and demographics for the mediator.
This sample (N=1,388 cases) presented the same pattern of purviews
for claims of discrimination (N=2,609) as did the dataset of all surveys
containing the question nature of claim or purview. Race claims repre-
sented approximately 19% of all purviews (N=501) presented within the
sample. Color claims, reverse discrimination claims, and national origin
claims collectively represented an approximate 13% of all purviews
(N=344), while sexual discrimination and sexual harassment claims repre-
sented approximately 19% of cases (N=494).
V. RESULTS
To explore the relationships among the nature of the claim or purview,
the race or gender of the mediator, and procedural justice indicators re-
garding satisfaction with the mediation process, the mediator, and overall
outcome, researchers conducted an exploratory multivariate regres-
110. Researchers used the MS Access database program to connect complainant exit
surveys to the individual mediator. The Access query function built out (and, as needed,
cleaned, transformed, restructured, etc.) consecutive tables and eventually crafted a new
integrated and combined sample. The researchers settled on MS Access for two primary
reasons: first, the Indiana Conflict Resolution Institute utilized MS Access for the RE-
DRESS evaluation (thus saving on any costs associated with transferring the data to an-
other database); and, second, the ease of MS Access when it came to combining “children”
and “parent” fields. This second reason was very important to the researchers: since any
given mediator had freedom under the REDRESS program to complete any number of
mediations, their footprint appeared across several mediations. Thus, the MS Access query
function allowed researchers to match the characteristics of any given mediator to the ap-
propriate mediation easily and without error.
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sion.111 Based on those results, researchers conducted nine chi-square
analyses reported below in tables. Tables 1, 2, and 3 examine differences
in satisfaction with mediation process, mediator, and outcome for race
discrimination claims comparing African-American and Caucasian
mediators. Tables 4, 5, and 6 examine satisfaction with mediation process,
mediator, and outcome for sex discrimination claims comparing male and
female mediators. Tables 7, 8, and 9 examine satisfaction with mediation
process, mediator, and outcome for sexual harassment claims comparing
male and female mediators.
Of all the tables, only Table 3 reports a statistically significant differ-
ence (P<.02) in participant perceptions based on the demographics of the
mediator. Specifically, in race discrimination claims, we found that com-
plainants were equally satisfied with fairness of the mediation process
(Table 1) and the fairness of the mediators (Table 2) whether mediators
were African-American or Caucasian.
Table 1. Race Discrimination Complaint:
Fairness of the Mediation by Race of Mediator
Satisfaction with the Fairness Race of Mediator
of the Mediation Process Caucasian African-American Total
Very or Somewhat Satisfied 359 (92.77%) 53 (89.83%) 412 (92.38%)
Very or Somewhat Unsatisfied 28 (7.23%) 6 (10.2%) 34 (7.62%)
Total 387 59 446
Note, c2 =.626, df = 1. Numbers in parentheses indicate column percentages.
Table 2. Race Discrimination Complaint:
Fairness of the Mediator by Race of Mediator
Satisfaction with the Fairness of Race of Mediator
the Mediator Caucasian African-American Total
Very or Somewhat Satisfied 396 (99.00%) 60 (98.4%) 456 (98.9%)
Very or Somewhat Unsatisfied 4 (1.0%) 1 (1.6%) 5 (1.1%)
Total 400 61 461
Note, c2 = .202, df = 1. Numbers in parentheses indicate column percentages.
However, Table 3 shows that complainants were statistically signifi-
cantly less satisfied with the overall outcome of the mediation when they
had African-American mediators.
111. Results available upon request. This work is still in progress.
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Table 3. Race Discrimination Complaint:
Satisfaction with Overall Outcome of Mediation by Race of Mediator
Satisfaction with the Overall Race of Mediator
Outcome of the Mediation Caucasian African-American Total
Very or Somewhat Satisfied 274 (76.5%) 34 (61.8%) 308 (74.6%)
Very or Somewhat Unsatisfied 84 (23.5%) 21 (38.2%) 105 (25.4%)
Total 358 55 413 (100%)
Note, c2 = 5.447, df = 1. Numbers in parentheses indicate column percentages.
Significant at *p < .05
There were no statistically significant differences based on the gender
of the mediator in any of Tables 4 through 9. Descriptive statistics (per-
centages) show that for sex discrimination claims reflected in Tables 4, 5,
and 6, there is very little difference in satisfaction with the mediation pro-
cess, mediator, or overall satisfaction whether the mediator is male or
female.
Table 4. Sexual Discrimination Complaint:
Fairness of the Mediation by Gender of Mediator
Satisfaction with the Fairness of Gender of Mediator
the Mediation Process Male Female Total
Very or Somewhat Satisfied 185 (94.4%) 163 (91.6%) 348 (93.0%)
Very or Somewhat Unsatisfied 11 (5.6%) 15 (8.4%) 26 (7.0%)
Total 196 178 374
Note, c2 = 1.143, df = 1. Numbers in parentheses indicate column percentages.
Table 5. Sexual Discrimination Complaint:
Fairness of the Mediator by Gender of the Mediator
Satisfaction with the Fairness of Gender of Mediator
the Mediator Male Female Total
Very or Somewhat Satisfied 198 (99.5%) 177 (100.0%) 375 (99.7%)
Very or Somewhat Unsatisfied 1 (0.5%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (0.3%)
Total 199 177 328
Note, c2 = .892, df = 1. Numbers in parentheses indicate column percentages.
Table 6. Sexual Discrimination Complaint: Satisfaction with Overall
Outcome of Mediation by Gender of Mediator
Satisfaction with the Overall Gender of Mediator
Outcome of the Mediation Male Female Total
Very or Somewhat Satisfied 131 (71.2%) 110 (71.0%) 241 (71.1%)
Very or Somewhat Unsatisfied 53 (28.8%) 45 (29.0%) 98 (28.9%)
Total 184 155 339
Note, c2 = .002, df = 1. Numbers in parentheses indicate column percentages.
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However, with Tables 7, 8, and 9, which reflect claims of sexual harass-
ment, descriptive statistics (percentages) reflect that complaints report
higher levels of satisfaction with the mediation process, mediator, and
overall outcome when the mediator is female. The results did not attain
statistical significance because the sample size is too small and several
cells have values of fewer than five.
Table 7. Sexual Harassment Complaint:
Fairness of the Mediation by Gender of Mediator
Satisfaction with the Fairness of Gender of Mediator
the Mediation Process Male Female Total
Very or Somewhat Satisfied 39 (90.7%) 46 (95.8%) 85 (93.4%)
Very or Somewhat Unsatisfied 4 (9.3%) 2 (4.2%) 6 (6.6%)
Total 43 48 91
Note, c2 = .971, df = 1. Numbers in parentheses indicate column percentages.
Table 8. Sexual Harassment Complaint:
Fairness of the Mediator by Gender of Mediator
Satisfaction with the Fairness of Gender of Mediator
the Mediator Male Female Total
Very or Somewhat Satisfied 43 (95.6%) 47 (100.0%) 90 (97.8%)
Very or Somewhat Unsatisfied 2 (4.4%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (2.2%)
Total 45 47 92
Note, c2 = 2.135, df = 1. Numbers in parentheses indicate column percentages.
Table 9. Sexual Harassment Complaint: Satisfaction with Overall
Outcome of Mediation by Gender of Mediator
Satisfaction with the Overall Gender of Mediator
Outcome of the Mediation Male Female Total
Very or Somewhat Satisfied 27 (61.4%) 31 (75.6%) 58 (68.2%)
Very or Somewhat Unsatisfied 17 (38.6%) 10 (24.4%) 27 (31.8%)
Total 44 41 85
Note, c2 = 1.987, df = 1. Numbers in parentheses indicate column percentages.
VI. DISCUSSION
We argue here that DSD is an important way to identify variables that
influence the perceptions of and outcomes for participants in mediation
programs in employment. REDRESS is a mediation program for discrim-
ination complaints; a key element of the program’s structure is its roster
of mediators. Every mediation program is a system design. A key element
for any system design in the Analytic Framework for DSD is accountabil-
ity, a concept directly relevant to concerns over bias in dispute resolution.
How can we make a system accountable? We argue here that procedural
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justice provides an important frame for evaluating a system design. Using
complainant perceptions of mediation fairness, mediator fairness, and
satisfaction with outcome in the USPS REDRESS program, we examined
whether it affects a mediation participant’s judgments when the media-
tor’s race or gender matches the nature of the claim or purview of an
employee’s complaint in race discrimination, sex discrimination, or sexual
harassment cases.
Our results support bringing a representative bureaucracy frame to this
work. Our main results suggest that African-American complainants are
equally satisfied with the mediation process and mediators, regardless of
mediator race or ethnicity, in race discrimination cases with the USPS.
However, they are less satisfied with the overall outcome in cases where
they have an African-American mediator. This result is actually consis-
tent with representative bureaucracy research on police, which has found
that a police force must achieve critical mass in diversity before positive
effects of representativeness kick in.112While the USPS REDRESS medi-
ator roster was during this period diverse compared to other rosters, Afri-
can Americans nevertheless represented a small percentage of the roster
as a whole. Moreover, mediators must remain impartial; while a com-
plainant may expect a better outcome when they are the same race as
their mediator, professional training may limit the degree to which
mediators may advocate for either party.
In contrast, women complainants are equally satisfied with the media-
tion process, mediators, and overall outcome in sex discrimination cases
regardless of mediator gender. However, though the result is not statisti-
cally significant in a chi-square analysis, they may be more satisfied with
the mediation process, mediators, and overall outcome in sexual harass-
ment cases when the mediator is a woman. This is consistent with active
representative bureaucracy research on police dealing with sexual assault
claims that finds women police officers have a positive impact on victims
coming forward.113
The results also support researchers’ calls for more empirical research
to untangle the subtle effects of demographics of race or ethnicity and
gender as to both mediators and participants in mediation. The results in
both our studies and previous studies suggest that perceptions and the
objective outcomes of mediation may play out differently depending
upon whether we examine: (1) racial or ethnic identity compared to gen-
der identity; (2) participants alone; (3) differences in matching partici-
pants’ and mediators’ demographics; and (4) how both mediators and
participants interact.
112. S. Nicholson-Crotty, J. Nicholson-Crotty & Fernandez, supra note 70, at 211–12
(finding support for representative bureaucracy theory that hiring more black police of-
ficers may reduce police violence against black citizens but only once the percentage of
blacks on the force is high enough to reach critical mass).
113. Meier & Nicholson-Crotty, supra note 68, at 856.
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Race, ethnicity, and gender must be examined as factors in the context
of a system or DSD. These studies present substantially differing con-
texts, from civil trial and small claims courts, to community mediation, to
the workplace of a large organization. These contexts in turn are nested
in our justice system, local, state, and national government, and cul-
ture.114 By using analysis of the DSD in which a given mediation case is
nested, we may be able to control for more of the exogenous variables
that give us a clearer picture of how bias manifests itself in these systems.
The MetroCourt Study provides one such example by comparing the
structure of litigation in court to the informal process of mediation and
controlling for structural factors such as the differential role of lawyers
and the gendered nature of repeat players. The rule of law and legal rules
act as a check or balance in court that is absent in a community mediation
setting. Controlling for DSD informs the social power dynamics that un-
derpin research findings, which on first analysis were labeled race or gen-
der bias. Moreover, that study provided an in-depth look at factors
shaping the distributive justice in these settings in the proportion of claim
awarded or settled for.
By analyzing the DSD of a dispute resolution program, and making it
accountable through evaluation and assessment of the procedural and
distributive justice it delivers, we can take measured steps toward uncov-
ering systemic bias in ADR. By designing programs with a conscious view
toward representative bureaucracy as diversity in the mediator and arbi-
trator rosters, over time we may be able to enhance perceptions of proce-
dural justice and the reality of distributive justice.
VII. CONCLUSION
Current scholarship is moving toward a more nuanced analysis, one
that considers that people’s biases may be implicit;115 people act on biases
of which they are not consciously aware regarding racial, ethnic, or gen-
der differences. These biases play out in the workplace through the im-
plementation of systems intended to enforce discrimination law, but
shaped in subtle ways by human interaction daily.116 Workplace conflict
management systems may purport to address workplace bullying, but al-
though workplace bullying is often cast in terms of status-blind harass-
ment, studies suggest that there is also some linkage among workplace
bullying, gender, race, and ethnicity.117 Implicit biases may play out in
114. ELINOR OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY (2005).
115. See Elayne E. Greenberg, Fitting the Forum to the Pernicious Fuss: A Dispute Sys-
tem Design to Address Implicit Bias and ‘Isms in the Workplace, 17 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 75, 77 (2015).
116. See Lauren B. Edelman, Howard S. Erlanger & John Lande, Internal Dispute Res-
olution: The Transformation of Civil Rights in the Workplace, 27 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 497
(1993); Lauren B. Edelman, Aaron C. Smyth & Asad Rahim, Legal Discrimination: Empir-
ical Sociolegal and Critical Race Perspectives on Antidiscrimination Law, 12 ANN. REV. L.
& SOC. SCI. 395 (2016).
117. Lamont E. Stallworth & Daniel J. Kaspar, Employing the Presidential Executive
Order and the Law to Provide Integrated Conflict Management Systems and ADR
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differences regarding our varying definitions of communities.118 By deep-
ening our empirical research subjects and methods, researchers may be
able unveil the structures in society that shape that bias.
Processes: The Proposed National Employment Dispute Resolution Act (NEDRA), 28
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 171, 227 (2013).
118. Clark Freshman, Privatizing Same-Sex “Marriage” Through Alternative Dispute
Resolution: Community-Enhancing Versus Community-Enabling Mediation, 44 UCLA L.
REV. 1687 (1997).
